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CRIMINAL LAW-RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY-Burnham v. People
-No.
14569-Decided June 12, 1939-DistrictCourt of Pueblo
-Hon. Harry Leddy, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. It is not necessary to convict one charged with receiving stolen property that there be direct proof of his knowledge that the
goods had been larcenously obtained.
2.
Facts examined and found to be sufficient to clearly establish
the jury's finding that defendant knew goods were stolen.
3.
It was not error for the trial court to admit in evidence two
articles stolen from the store of prosecuting witness, although such articles were not found in possession of defendant, for they were admitted
only for the purpose of establishing that there was a theft.
4.
" 'One of the necessary elements of the crime of receiving stolen
property is that the property has, in fact, been stolen by someone other
than the one charged with receiving it.' "
5.
Evidence of thefts of other goods from the same owner by the
same thief is admissible where it is connected with the same transaction.
6.
It is unnecessary for the prosecution to elicit from the thieves
the information as to the theft where such evidence was otherwise clearly
established.
7.
Affidavits filed to impeach verdict examined and found not to
warrant making an exception to the general rule of Boyles v. People, 90
Colo. 32, 6 P. (2nd) 7, to effect that affidavits of jurors are inadmissible
to impeach their verdict.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bouck not participating. EN BANC.

MURDER-SELF-DEFENSE - INSTRUCTIONS - EVIDENCE -CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Agnes v. People-No. 14471-Decided June
26, 1939-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. Stanley H. Johnson,
Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Evidence reviewed and found to fully warrant jury's
verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree.
2.
A statement made by decedent to her mother that "Angelo is
going to take me over to Five Points to beat me up," made in presence
of defendant, is admissible in evidence.
3.
Voluntary statements of decedent, 15 minutes after shooting,
that "Angelo shot me; Angelo did it," are statements of facts and not of
opinion; and where defendant admitted in a statement made shortly after
his arrest, that he shot her, "the admission of such statements, whether
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they were dying declarations, res gestae or otherwise, was not prejudicial
to defendant."
4. Where jury has been instructed that if there was any reasonable doubt in their minds as to the matter of self-defense, they must
acquit; and where they are told that unless they believed or entertained
a reasonable doubt on the subject, they could not properly find that
defendant shot in self-defense, and that the killing was justified, there is
no prejudicial error in giving an instruction to effect that if they "believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant in killing * * * (wife) was
not acting in self-defense against Roy Finley, the killing was not justified, and you should proceed to determine degree of his guilt, in accordance with the preceding instructions."
5. An instruction which begins "If you jury believe," without
including the words "from the evidence" is not per se prejudicial, particularly where many other instructions are given containing the phrase.
6. An instruction to effect that if the shot in question was fired
with deliberation and premeditation, with malice aforethought, with
intent to kill Finley, but killing wife instead, makes defendant guilty,
is proper, and it was immaterial that such deliberation, premeditation
and malice were not directed against the decedent.
7. Articles V and VI of the amendments to the Federal Constitution are not limitations upon the state government, but impose limitations on the Federal government only.
8. Where defendant was present during all the proceedings up to
and at the time of conviction there is no violation of the Colorado Constitution, Article II, Section 16.
9. Chapter 95, S.L. 1905, page 199 does not apply where one is
convicted of murder and the punishment fixed at death, and Section 538,
Chapter 48, 1935 C. S. A., does apply to effect that after sentence the
sheriff shall deliver defendant to warden in the penitentiary, "who shall
keep such convict in solitary confinement until the infliction of the death
penalty."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Bouck not participating. EN BANC.
CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION-

RESIGNATIONS

-WITHDRAWAL

OF

RESIGNATIONS-EVIDENCE-ACTION OF BOARD-Ira R. Taylor
v. Board of Control of the State Industrial School, et al.-No.
14556-Decided June 26, 1939-District Court of DenverHon. Stanley H. Johnson, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: 1. Action of mandate to compel reinstatement of Taylor
as superintendent of State Industrial School, and to compel payment of
salary if it be determined he is entitled to the office. Petition dismissed,
and Taylor seeks reversal.
2. Taylor was in classified civil service of the state, and assumed
duties March 2, 1937. On August 17, 1938, Taylor wrote board, presenting his resignation, effective January 1. 1939.
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3. On December 16, 1939, board acted upon resignation and
accepted same. December 17, 1939, Taylor requested withdrawal of
resignation, basing its presentation on a mistake. The board advised
Taylor of acceptance of resignation on December 27, 1938. By letter
of December 30, 1938, Taylor advised board of his refusal to recognize
action of board, and on same day board wrote letter to Taylor informing
him of board's refusal to accept withdrawal of resignation.
HELD: 1. Lack of sufficient proof to establish right of reinstatement.
2. No proof being offered concerning mistake, court could not
consider the matter.
3.
The lower court did not err in finding that State Civil Service
Commission accepted resignation of Taylor, since right to revoke his
resignation was dependent upon its not having been accepted by commission before he attempted to withdraw it.
4. Taylor had right to resign subject to state's correlative right
to refuse to accept where it would result in injury to the public, and,
granting such right, the commission could and did accept Taylor's resignation, and his attempt to withdraw it was futile.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Young concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY-EXEMPLARY DAMAGES-EVIDENCE-MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-SURPRISE AND ACCIDENT-FALSE
STATEMENT -

CROSS-EXAMINATION

-

COLLATERAL ISSUE

-

DISCRETION OF LOWER COURT--Schlessman v. Brainard-No.
14386-Decided June 26, 1939-District Court of Denver-

Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
1. B brought action for assault and battery and for
actual and exemplary damages, the latter being based upon the defendant's guilt of wanton and reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights and
feelings.
2. Defendant denied allegations of complaint and affirmatively
alleged: Provocation by plaintiff, accord and satisfaction, disturbance
by plaintiff which defendant was lawfully trying to suppress. By crosscomplaint, defendant sought to recover for defamation, seeking actual
and exemplary damages.
3. Verdict for plaintiff--defendant's motion for new trial overruled and judgment entered.
HELD: 1. Contention that court erred in permitting the jury to
award exemplary damages because of insufficiency of evidence cannot be
considered because:
a. Such damages are recoverable where wrongful act was committed recklessly, wantonly, or without provocation or excuse.
b. On highly conflicting evidence, jury's resolution thereon will
be upheld where there is evidence of the necessary elements upon which
jury could exercise its discretion.
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2. As to motion for new trial based upon accident and surprise
occurring at the trial in that a disinterested witness had testified that he
had heard, at scene of the altercation, the wife of the defendant express
surprise at the defendant's conduct, which statement was in conflict with
statement of witness previously given to defendant that he had heard
nothing at the scene, the court held adversely to defendant's contention
on the grounds:
a. The witness had made statements on another matter, which
were brought forward by defendant without proceeding into the alleged
prejudicial statement.
b. Said witness was not cross-examined on the matter by the defendant.
c. Manifesting the surprise after verdict is not timely.
d. False testimony is generally not a ground for new trial, unless
induced by the party benefiting thereby.
e. Remark was obviously on a collateral issue.
f. Such evidence should be of such character as would probably
change the result.
g. Where lower court has exercised its discretion on the matter,
appellate court will not reverse save for an abuse thereof.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Young concur. IN DEPARTMENT.

TAXATION-FEES-COLLECTION-OWNERSHIP-CONSTRUCTION

OF

Moffat Tunnel Improvement District, a Colorado Corporation,plaintiff in error, v. John F. McGuire, Manager
of Revenue and Ex-Officio Treasurer of the City and County
of Denver, defendant in error-No. 14322- Decided February 6,
1939-Error to the District Court of the City and County of
Denver-Hon. Joseph J. Walsh, Judge--Judgment Affirmed.
I.
Suit by the Moffat Tunnel Improvement District to
FACTS:
recover certain fees from McGuire in his official capacity, collected by
him in connection with sales for Moffat Tunnel Assessments and redemption from such sales.
2. It was conceded by both sides that the treasurer of every
county wholly or partly within the district, including city and county
of Denver, is vested by statutory authority to collect the fees, but the
district contended that such fees belonged to it and not to the treasurer
or to said city and county. Judgment below for treasurer.
1. Fees collected under authority by an officer for a
HELD:
public service presumably become the property of the officer authorized
to collect them.
2. It is not unusual to designate an officer of one governmental
unit to perform services for an entirely different governmental unit in
STATUTES-The
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the interest of public economy, concerning which the legislative authority
may use its discretion.
3.
Absent express statutory provision that fees go into the district treasury, the trial court rightly decided the fees belonged to the
treasury of the city and county of Denver.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Bock not participating.
EN BANC.
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-INSTRUCTIONS-PRIMA FACIE CASEDIRECTED VERDICT--John Beery, plaintiff in error, v. The People
of the State of Colorado, defendant in error-No. 14496-Decided February 6, 1939-Error to the District Court of the City
and County of Denver-Hon. Joseph J. Walsh, Judge--On application for supersedeas- Judgment Affirmed.
HELD:
Without stating any facts, court affirmed judgment of
conviction in grand larceny case, holding that no serious violation of
recognized rules for admitting evidence was shown; that instructions
were ample and adequate; and that prima facie case was made on evidence wholly circumstantial and not inherently unconvincing, absent
any evidence by defendant to overcome it except by cross-examination
of some of the People's witnesses. Trial court, therefore, rightly refused to direct an acquittal.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. IN DEPARTMENT.

PROMISSORY NOTES--SURETIES-PERSONS PRIMARILY LIABLE-ENDORSEMENTS-RELEASE OF GUARANTOR-Winton v. Sullivan

-No. 14542-DecidedJune 12, 1939-DistrictCourt of Arapahoe County-Hon. H. E. Munson, Judge-Reversed.
HELD: 1. A surety or accommodation party to a negotiable instrument is primarily liable.
2. An endorsement on a promissory note, as follows: "Demand
notice and protest waived. Payment guaranteed." makes the endorser a
surety or accommodation endorser within the meaning of '35 C. S. A.,
C. 112, Sec. 29.
3. Where, in the negotiation of a loan, a note is signed by defendant as vice-president of the maker, and endorsed by him personally before delivery, guaranteeing payment, and where the assignee of payee
'receives a payment of 20% on the note from a stranger to the instrument,
and accepts same in full settlement of claim against maker, without consent of guarantor (defendant), latter may not contend that he is released
from further liability on the note.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Bouck not participating.
EN BANC.
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TAXES-RECOVERY OF TAXES PAID UNDER MISTAKE OR ERRORStephens & Co. v. Board of Equalization, etc.-No. 14470-Decided July 3, 1939-District Court of Denver-Hon. George F.
Dunklee, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
1. Where, in a case filed by plainitff in error to recover
taxes paid, it appears that plaintiff voluntarily paid the taxes, that the
error involved was due solely to calculations contained in plaintiff in error's own tax schedule; that the schedule was voluntarily made by it;
that the error was due solely to plaintiff in error's own negligence and
not to any action of the taxing agencies; that the facts which show the
mistake were in the sole possession of the taxpayer, the plaintiff in error
is barred from any recovery.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Knous and Mr. Chief
Justice Hilliard concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
WILLS - TRUSTS - BENEFICIARIES - APPOINTEES - MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS - CORPORATIONS - RENUNCIATION OF APPOINTEES-EFFECTS OF RENUNCIATION-People, et al. v. City
and County of Denver, et al.-No. 14477-Decided July 3,1939
-County Court of Lake County (Estate of Samuel D. Nicholson,
deceased) -Hon. Thomas Evans, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: 1. Reversal sought of judgment approving contract having effect of terminating a trust and directing trustees to pay over to
contracting parties corpus of the trust.
2. Testator left surviving two children, Edward and Ruth, and
made provision for certain payments per month during their lifetime,
and also made provisions for certain monthly annuities to nieces, nephews and grandchildren until they reached ages 24. Latter beneficiaries,
except one who has attained majority and a minor passed age of 24
years. Testator's child, Ruth, died.
3.
Ruth's death left Edward sole heir of testator, and he was sole
heir of Ruth. Corpus of estate was in excess of $900,000.00.
4. Testator provided for bank to hold in trust rest and remainder
of estate, and upon death of his children to pay over one-half to hospital
for erection of a wing to hospital, and the other half to be given to City
of Denver for erection of monument.
5.
Subsequently agreement entered into by Edward, City and
County of Denver (authorized by City Council), and hospital, whereby
certain amount was to be paid on certain day to Edward. to Ruth B.
Nicholson (part of which was for establishment of annuity), to Samuel
D. Nicholson II (annuity as to part thereof created), to City and County
of Denver, and to hospital.
HELD:
1. Disposition of cause requires no determination of
question of the appealable interest of trustee, or of the question of the
qualification of the judge by reason of interest.
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2. Trust created not a spendthrift trust: did not provide against
improvidence or incapacity; lacked clear intention to create such trust.
3. The hospital and city are merely prospective appointees to be
appointed by the trustee bank upon Edward's death.
4. Will speaks as of time of death of testator. Conditions under
which the bank's power of appointment will become capable of being
exercised are sure to happen. Such exercise of power can fail only if
appointees become incapable of taking, or if they refuse to accept appointments.
5. Both hospital and city, being sui juris, may accept or refuse
appointments, as they see fit.
6. Because of dire straits of hospital there may be failure of power
to appoint by reason of incapacity. In such case, there being no devise
over, Edward would take as heir. By the contract he surrendered that
right, and the hospital by such contract renounced and waived its appointment, thereby vesting Edward with its interest.
7. City likewise renounced and waived its appointment by entering into the agreement, which action the city by constitutional provision
had the power to do.
8. The present city council can bind the council existent at time
of Edward's death, where others have surrendered or acquired rights by
reason thereof.
9.
"Upon the vesting of the estate in Edward with the consequent
termination of the trust created by the will, the trustee bank has no further interest, and may not determine or control the manner in which
Edward shall deal with the estate vested in him. In making gifts to his
children and directly to charity, in providing for the retention of a part
of the estate by himself and in setting up a trust to secure payment of an
annuity to himself and his wife for their lives with gifts over to the city
and the hospital, he is merely exercising his right to deal with his own
property as his judgment directs and this he may lawfully do."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bouck not participating. EN BANC.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-Moreno

et al. v. Industrial Commission-No. 14539-Decided July 3,
1939-District Court of Denver-Hon. Joseph J. Walsh, Judge

-Affirmed.
HELD: 1.

The furnishing of a burial plot for decedent, by em-

ployer, is not to be considered as the payment of compensation such as is

necessary to take the case out of the statute of limitations, which requires
filing of notice of claim within six months after the injury or within

one year after death resulting therefrom.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Young concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
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CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-EVIDENCE--JURY--Catalina u. People
-No.
14491-Decided July 3, 1939-DistrictCourt of Chaff ee
County-Hon. James L. Cooper, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
1. Evidence reviewed and found to support verdict of

jury.
2.
Where jury upon competent testimony arrives at verdict of
guilty of murder in the first degree, it is its duty to fix the penalty and
there is no warrant for interference by the court.
3.
Court properly refused admission of testimony that deceased
had a reputation for quarrelsomeness, since there was no evidence that
defendant knew deceased prior to night of shooting, and it did not appear that he had ever heard of him or his reputation.
4. While the jury should not have been permitted to attend a
theater during the progress of the trial, considering the gravity of the
charge and the extreme penalty involved, there is no prejudicial error
since no specific prejudice by reason of this occurrence was shown.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Bouck not
participating. EN BANC.
LEASES -

ABANDONMENT -

SURRENDER -

BALANCE OF RENT

-

ESTOPPEL-Bastien v. Bronstine-No. 14428-DecidedJune 26,
1939-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. George F. Dunhlee, Judge
-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff, as lessor, rented real estate to defendant, as
lessee, for a period of one year under written lease providing that lessee
had paid first and last month's rent, and that if lessee leaves premises
vacant, lessor may sue for balance due for unexpired term unless lessor
rents same, and in that event, such rent to be applied on claim before
expiration date; and lessor sues for balance of rent except for last month.
Lessee defended on ground that typewritten paragraph in lease as to payment of rent for last month converted the action into one at common law
for damages, and that case, therefore, should have been submitted to jury.
Trial court thought otherwise and directed verdict for plaintiff.
HELD:
1. Evidence examined and found to be insufficient to
establish any acceptance of a surrender; or any basis for estoppel. The
facts clearly show an abandonment of the lease by the lessee.
2.
The only possible question the court would have been justified
in submitting to the jury was one concerning lessor's failure to comply
with terms of the lease, and there was no evidence at all on that point.
3.
The damages are liquidated, and there is no ambiguity concerning the clauses in the lease relative to them.
4.
The court did not err in rejecting offer of testimony of defendant to effect that plaintiff would have the last month's rent in event defendant found other premises, for such offer was an attempt to vary the
terms of the lease, and the language of the contract needed no explanation.
5.
The fact that lessee left key with lessor and that lessor did
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nothing except bring suit after expiration of lease, does not destroy
lessor's rights to balance of rent.
6. There are not sufficient facts to sustain defendant's allegation
of estoppel, particularly since landlord did not agree to, and did not accept, tenant's surrender of the premises.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Burke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION-ADMISSION-OLD AGE PENSION
AMENDMENT-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT-Fairall, et al. v. J.
Charles Frisbee-No. 14411--Decided July 3, 1939--County
Court of Denver-Hon. Homer G. Preston, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: 1. Frisbee asked for declaration of rights against administrative bodies as to status as pensioner, and for $45.00 pension for
September, 1937, and additional $15.00 for months of January to August, inclusive, over $30.00 received.
2. Demurrer thereto overruled; demurrants elected to stand, and
judgment for Frisbee in the sum of $165.00 entered.
HELD:
1. Old Age Pension Amendment being self-executing
only as to establishment of fund, court erred in adjudging $120.00 for
months of January to August, inclusive, in favor of Frisbee.
2. Admission of receipt of $30.00 until September 1, 1937, prior
to act of legislation affecting Old Age Pension Amendment, automatically disposed of alleged cause of action for said months of January to
August.
3.
Because record disclosed that Frisbee's status of old age was
already established, there was nothing left for determination under
Declaratory Judgments Law.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bouck not partic.ipating. EN BANC.
ESTATES -WILLS -PROBATE -SETTING
ASIDE PROBATE-In re:
Estate of Sullivan v. Sullivan, et al.-No. 14472-Decided June
26, 1939--County Court of Weld County-Hon. Robert G.
Strong, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Trial court denied petition of plaintiff in error to vacate
the judgment admitting her mother's will to probate. She alleged that
she executed a waiver consenting to the setting of the will for probate;
but that her consent was secured by fraud and deceit, etc.
HELD: 1. A County Court may, upon proper grounds, revoke
the probate of a will.
2. "*
* * whether the petition is based upon the inherent
right of the county court to afford relief, or upon the code provision
(Sec. 81 pertaining to relief from civil judgments), the application is
discretionary with the trial court."
3.
The appellate court will not interfere unless a gross abuse of
discretion appears.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice Bakke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.

